The sacking of Julien Nagelsman comes as a big surprise to us after he took Bayern to the quarter-finals of the Champions League defeating the likes of Xavi's Barcelona at group stage and PSG in the Round of 16. However, Bayern has done well in UCL but isn't able to do the same in the domestic league. Like other seasons Bayern is not the only team dominating in the Bundesliga in terms of gameplay and results. There is debate on this issue as some say Bayern isn't playing like the best club of the League while others have the opinion that in the Bundesliga other clubs are also slowly improving their gameplay as the combined effort of data and video analysis of the opponents in modern-day football can even make an average team cut many short mistakes on the pitch they used to do previously. Nagelsman got sacked after a defeat at the hands of Bayern 04 Leverkusen and slipped to the second spot of the league table during the final stage of the league in this season. Bayern has already appointed Tuchel as his successor who will lead Bayern against Pep's Manchester City in the UCL quarter-final.
Now in the rest of the sections of this article we will have a look at the tactical breakdown of Bayern's gameplay under Nagelsman.
How Bayern used to build up from the back under Nagelsman against a high-pressing opponent?
Nagelsman preferred to build up from the back and as rigid formations don't matter these days we won't be mentioning any rigid formations as such in this article. To be more precise these days analysts look for instantaneous positioning of players during buildup or while defending an opponent's attacks.
Let's study from the tactical boards. First, let's focus on the highlighted section. While building up from back Bayern under Nagelsman preferred 3 CBs( LCB-No.4, CB-No.2, RCB-No.5), while the wingbacks/ wingers ( No 22 & 19) such as generally used to position themselves high up the pitch to pin the opposition fullbacks high up the pitch on the flanks. In this buildup the CB- Upamecano drops near the GK Sommer(No.1). Now to stop the press of the opposition forward on Upamecano No.6 Kimmich drops near the box which draws the attention of 2 opposition players there and helps No.2 to drop freely near goalkeeper.
Within the marked area what Sommer generally used to do is pass the ball to kimmich. Now passing the ball to kimmich draws attention of both the opposition players near kimmich that allows free space for Upamecano. Kimmitch passes back to Upamecano who finds Pavard on the right side.
Simultaneously in the white highlighted area Goretzka would drift wide and with him would pull one opposition midfielder whoever marked him. This creates a space in the midfield where one striker would drop, in this case, Muller. On the other hand in the blue highlighted area Upamecano after passing to Pavard would quickly jump in the space behind the opposition forward as shown. The opposition forward often failed to track back because his focus shifts toward Pavard when Upamecano initially passes to Pavard and the run of Upamecano behind him falls in his shadow spot. Upamecano would often do that because Pavard wouldn't be able to pass directly to Muller even if Muller drops in the midfield. So Upamecano would act as a mediator between Pavard and Muller in this case. At times Cancleo and Davis would make artificial Counter attacking runs down the wings to keep the opposition wingbacks pinned who would have in other cases quickly moved into midfield to mark the dropping CF(Muller).
This is how Bayern would break the opponent's high press and buildup from the back under Naglesmann. The next part would be uploaded soon. To get more tactical insights about Bayern and other clubs keep following thefootballsay.com .
Ref: TheMastermindSite, Football Bundeski.
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